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FOUNDATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INNER MODEL
HYPOTHESIS
TATIANA ARRIGONI∗ AND SY-DAVID FRIEDMAN
1. Introduction.
The goal of this paper is to bring the Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH), an axiomatic
approach formulated by the second author in [Fri06], into the current debate on
the implications of independence results in set theory. We argue that the IMH
provides an alternative to the two main contenders in this debate: the view
that the universe of sets is inherently undetermined, its essential features being
exhausted by the axioms of ZFC, and the opposing view that the next step toward
the goal of making our knowledge of the universe of sets more determinate consists
in the search for a suitable extension of the system ZFC + large cardinal axioms.
Both perspectives are objectionable in principle and the Inner Model Hypothesis
confirms this in fact.
A brief overview of the current situation with regard to independence in set theory
is given in section 2. Section 3 illustrates the main views in the current debate
on the implications of independence phenomena. Criticism against these views is
presented in section 4, while the implications of the Inner Model Hypothesis are
discussed in section 5.
Both authors wish to thank the John Templeton Foundation for its generous
support of this work in the framework of the Infinity Project at the Centre de
Recerca Matema`tica, Bellaterra, Spain.
2. A puzzling state of affairs.
As a consequence of Go¨del’s construction of the inner model L and Cohen’s intro-
duction of forcing techniques in set theory, the existence of alternative universes
satisfying the accepted axioms (i.e., the axioms of the system ZFC) has emerged
as an inescapable fact. In addition to ZFC, the universe L of constructible
sets satisfies the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis (GCH) (and therefore the
Singular Cardinal Hypothesis (SCH)), the assertion that there is a definable non-
measurable set of reals, and the Singular Square Principle; it fails to satisfy the
∗ The first author is supported by Provincia Autonoma di Trento, Italy (Bando Post-Doc
2007).
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Suslin Hypothesis, the Whitehead conjecture, the Borel Conjecture and the ex-
istence of a Borel bijection between any two non-Borel analytic sets.1 On the
other hand, many of these principles behave differently in forcing extensions of
L and, relative to the existence of large cardinals, they all behave differently in
some model of ZFC.2
As a natural move in the attempt to decide statements independent from ZFC
and thereby make our picture of the universe of sets more determinate, candidate
axioms for extending ZFC have been proposed and investigated. In line with a
suggestion of Go¨del, a prominent role in this investigation has been played by
large cardinal axioms.3 With reference to such axioms Go¨del says:
It is not impossible that [...] some completeness theorem would
hold which would say that every proposition expressible in set the-
ory is decidable from the present axioms plus some true assertion
about the largeness of the universe of all sets. ([FDK+90], 150-3)
What came to be known as “Go¨del’s program for new axioms” did not however
produce the desired results as far as independence is concerned. The statement of
greatest interest which is independent from ZFC, Cantor’s Continuum Hypoth-
esis, is also independent from “ZFC + large cardinal axioms”. But a relevant
general fact emerged: The study of large cardinal axioms took the form of a
strictly mathematical venture (“the theory is assumed and theorems are proved
in the ordinary mathematical manner”, [FK10], ix), and its mathematical success
was used as a source of evidence in set theory. Success is meant here as Go¨del
intended it, i.e. as consisting in axioms being “fruitful in consequences, exactly in
‘verifiable’ consequences, i.e. consequences demonstrable without the new axiom,
whose proofs by means of the new axiom, however, are considerably simpler and
easier to discover [...]”4, as well as in axioms shedding light “upon a whole disci-
pline, and furnishing [...] powerful methods for solving given problems”([Goe47],
183).5
It is however worth noting that mathematical success can be reasonably ascribed
to extensions of ZFC incompatible with “ZFC + large cardinal axioms”. ZFC
1GCH is the assertion that for any cardinal number κ, 2κ = κ+, while the SCH, implied
by GCH, is the same assertion for κ a singular strong limit cardinal. For the other principles
mentioned see [Jec03].
2Specifically, there are forcing extensions of L in which GCH is false, definable sets of reals
are measurable and the Suslin Hypothesis, Whitehead Conjecture and the Borel Conjecture are
true. Models of the negation of SCH, the negation of the Singular Square Principle and the
existence of a Borel bijection between any two non-Borel analytic sets can be obtained assum-
ing the existence of a hypermeasurable cardinal, a supercompact cardinal and a measurable
cardinal, respectively.
3Large cardinal axioms assert the existence of cardinals κ with various strong properties,
always implying that the family of sets of hereditary cardinality < κ is a model of ZFC.
4“[...] and make it possible to condense into one proof many different proofs”, [Goe47], 183.
5On the success of large cardinal axioms see [Hau04] and [Arr07].
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+ V = L, for instance, is fruitful in consequences, furnishes powerful methods
for solving problems and introduces the concept of constructibility, important
throughout set theory.6 Of course this theory is incompatible with ZFC + “there
exists a measurable cardinal”.7
How the mathematical success of large cardinal axioms is related to the program
of making the picture of the set-theoretical universe more determinate – and,
more generally, to the aim of producing definitive set-theoretical hypotheses – is
discussed in the next two sections.
3. Reactions.
Faced with the situation described in section 2, set-theorists show diverse re-
actions. The existence of mutually incompatible, successful extensions of ZFC
led some to the conclusion that the notion set-theoretic universe is inherently
undetermined. This position is clearly expressed by Shelah in [She03]:
I do not feel “a universe of ZFC” is like “the Sun”, it is rather like
“a human being” or “a human being of some fixed nationality.”
[...] You may think “does CH, i.e., 2ℵ0 = ℵ1 hold?” is like “Can a
typical American be Catholic?”([She03], 211)
A different attitude is endorsed by those who, due to the success of large cardinal
axioms, regard ZFC as “the twentieth century choice” for the axioms of set theory
and consider “ZFC + large cardinal axioms” to be the contemporary theory
of sets, “to be adopted by all, as part of a broadest point of view”.8 In fact
these authors do not draw conclusions similar to Shelah’s from the fact that
large cardinals are preserved under forcing, and hence models of “ZFC + large
cardinal axioms” exist in which mutually exclusive propositions are true. They
put stress not on the failure of large cardinals to produce a determinate picture
of the universe of sets but instead on the mathematical success of large cardinal
axioms, and explicitly take this as providing evidence for the correctness (or
truth) of these axioms, even regarding them as definitive hypotheses.9 At the
6Inner and core models for large cardinals can be regarded as generalizations of the universe
L of constructible sets. See [Jen95].
7That if a measurable cardinal exists, then V 6= L was proved by Scott in 1961. See [Jec03]
for details.
8See, respectively, [Woo01] and [Ste00], where the point is made that the “broadest point
of view” proviso is meant to exclude from attention the temporary adoption of restrictive
assumptions as a convenient device for avoiding irrelevant structure” (e.g.. “V = L is often
temporarily assumed for such reasons by set-theorists who do not believe it [...]”, [Ste00], 422).
9E.g. projective Determinacy (PD), implied by the existence of infinitely many Woodin car-
dinals, is said in [Woo01] to be “the correct axiom for the projective sets”, yielding forcing
invariant answers to questions independent of ZFC (e.g. the measurability of projective sets),
which, when first formulated, were considered unsolvable. See [Woo01], 570. By forcing in-
variance is here meant that no sentence in the language of second order arithmetic, in which
properties of projective sets are formulated, can be shown to be independent of the existence
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same time the hope is expressed that new correct (true) axioms will emerge
that decide questions independent from the system “ZFC + large cardinals”. As
a result, the program of making the picture of the set-theoretical universe more
determinate is placed in the restricted form: find suitable axiomatic extensions of
“ZFC + large cardinals”.
This forms part of Woodin’s conclusions in [Woo01], where an axiomatic proposal
is advanced that is intended to play the same role with regard to third order
number theory, in which the Continuum Hypothesis (CH) can be formulated,
that is played by large cardinal axioms with regard to second order number
theory.10
So, is the Continuum Hypothesis solvable? Perhaps I am not com-
pletely confident that the “solution” I have sketched is the solution,
but it is for me convincing evidence that there is a solution. [...]
The universe of all sets is a large place. We have just barely begun
to understand it. ([Woo01], 690)
Both Shelah’s and Woodin’s positions are not immune to criticism. Objections
to them are advanced in the next section.
4. Criticism.
Let us start with positions like those expressed by Woodin regarding extensions
of “ZFC + large cardinal axioms”. According to them, successful, hence correct
(true), set-theoretic axioms (large cardinal axioms) have been discovered that set-
tle some notable questions independent from ZFC. This implies that the program
for making the picture of the universe more determined cannot but consist in ex-
tending “ZFC + large cardinal axioms”. We argue that the implication “success
→ correctness (or truth)” presupposed by this view is objectionable, and makes
it ultimately untenable.
Observe first that by assuming the implication: “success → correctness (or
truth)”, one cannot do justice to the existence of mutually incompatible successful
systems of set theory (like “ZFC + large cardinal axioms” and
“ZFC + V = L”). For correctness (truth) is commonly intended as a matter
of all or nothing, ruling out the possibility of equally correct (true) but mutually
exclusive axiomatic systems. This would be the case, though, if evidence due
to success were to imply correctness (truth) in set theory. On the other hand,
of large cardinals implying PD by the method of set-forcing. In fact, by a theorem of Woodin,
if you suppose that every set belongs to an iterable inner model satisfying “there are ω Woodin
cardinals”, then, if M and N are set-generic extensions of V , you have L(R)M ≡ L(R)N . See
[Woo01].
10Second and third order number theory are presented in [Woo01] as the theories of the
structures < H(ω1),∈> and < H(ω2),∈>. See [Woo01] for details.
FOUNDATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE INNER MODEL HYPOTHESIS 5
assuming the implication “success→ correctness (or truth)” and denying correct-
ness or truth to e.g. “ZFC + V = L”, one would ipso facto deny its mathematical
success, which is undeniable.
The success of the axiom of constructibility (V = L) is often regarded as a
counterexample to the view that success is all there is to correctness and truth
in set theory.
A favorite example against the pragmatic view that we accept an
axiom because of its elegance (simplicity) and power (usefulness)
is the constructibility hypothesis. It should be accepted accord-
ing to the pragmatic view but is not generally accepted as true.
([Wan74], 196)
Wang suggests what would be necessary and sufficient conditions for an axiomatic
system to be accepted (as correct or true). Beyond being successful, the system
should be explicitly suggested by the meaning of set.
[V = L] is likely to be false according to the iterative concept
of set. Basically it is felt that the pragmatic view leaves out the
criterion of intuitive plausibility. ([Wan74], 196)
Wang’s argument, however, does not apply to most large cardinal axioms and,
especially, to the ones discussed by Woodin. “Correct” (“true”) principles like
Projective Determinacy, and the large cardinal axioms implying it, lack any clear
direct link to the iterative concept, which Wang calls upon as the meaning of
set. In fact referring to these axioms, and explicitly describing them as “true”,
Woodin comments:
There are natural questions about H(ω1) which are not solvable
from ZFC. However, there are axioms for H(ω1) which resolve
these questions [...] and which are clearly true. But the truth
of these axioms became evident only after a great deal of work.
([Woo01], 569)
Moreover, also the implication “success and intuitive plausibility (adherence to
the iterative concept) → correctness (truth)” is objectionable. For it can be
plausibly suggested that the iterative concept is a concept that arose alongside
successful set-theoretic developments, and as such is a metaphorical reformula-
tion of the insights delivered by the latter.11 The same holds for methodolog-
ical maxims that are often presented as inspired by the iterative concept, like
e.g. “maximize”, the view that the universe of sets should be high and wide, so
“the more sets one proves to exist, the better”. A mathematical concept could
only be attached to the sentence “the universe is maximal” only after Scott’s
result that if a measurable cardinal exists then V 6= L was obtained. Viewing
the iterative concept and methodological principles like “maximization” in this
11See [Arr07] and [Arr].
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way leads one to reject Wang’s suggestion that “intuitive plausibility” (i.e. ad-
herence to the iterative concept or “maximization”) is sufficient, in conjunction
with success, to produce truth or correctness in set theory. For, along with every
system of set theory that turns out to be successful (according to Go¨del’s char-
acterization of success), a distinguished concept of set and a system of preferred
methodological maxims is likely to emerge.12 Since competing successful sys-
tems of axioms exist in set theory, taking the conjunction “success and intuitive
plausibility” to imply correctness (or truth), would still leave one with mutually
exclusive, correct (true) systems of axioms. This contrasts with how the term
correct (true) is meant to be used.
It is also worth noting that methodological maxims are very far from suggest-
ing unique proposals for axiomatic extensions of ZFC. E.g. “maximization” may
suggest the principle “there exists a j : V → V ”, which is incompatible with the
Axiom of Choice, also in line with maximality considerations.13 The Inner Model
Hypothesis, incompatible with large cardinal axioms, offers yet another example
of the ambiguity of the concept of “maximization” (see the next section).
One might still object to our criticism by asserting that success comes in degrees
in set theory, making it possible to draw a distinction between incompatible suc-
cessful systems according to their degree of success, and suggest that it is only
the most successful set-theoretic system that deserves to be regarded as correct
or true. That mathematical success comes in degrees seems to be the case. Ac-
cording to Go¨del’s characterization of success, in fact, the term “successful” is to
be applied to mathematical developments through which a link is established be-
tween formerly unrelated mathematical facts. A link may consist in one theory’s
enabling the interpretation of another in its own terms. Under these circum-
stances, the former would reveal itself to be “more successful” than the latter.
In fact, as an implication of Scott’s theorem, the universe L could be seen as
a proper sub-universe of V and studied “from within” V under large cardinal
axioms, thereby convincing some of the superior success of “ZFC + large cardi-
nals” over “ZFC + V = L”. Supposing “maximality” to be essentially a mat-
ter of maximizing interpretative power, Steel says the following with regard to
ZFC + V = L:
In this light we can see why most set-theorists reject V = L as
restrictive: adopting it restricts the interpretative power of the
language of set theory. The language of set theory as used by the
believer of V = L can certainly be translated into the language of
set theory as used by the believer in measurable cardinals, via the
translation φ 7→ φL. There is no translation in the other direction.
12This view is presented and motivated in [Arr].
13This point is made in [Hau05]. The principle “there exists a j : V → V ” (there is a
nontrivial elementary embedding of the universe into itself) was proved to be contradictory
with Choice by Kunen. See [Jec03] for details.
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While it is true that adopting V = L enables one to settle new
formal sentences, this is in fact a completely sterile move, because
one settles φ by giving it the same interpretation as φL which can
be settled in anyone’s theory. ([Ste00], 423)
Yet it remains that while one may accept that success comes in degrees, this
is usually not the case as far as correctness and truth are concerned. Accord-
ingly, correctness (truth) might well be supposed to be an attribute of the “most
successful system of set theory”, but this could not be done by arguing that cor-
rectness (truth) is an implication of success. The only possible way for one to
coherently say that a successful axiomatic system for sets is correct (true) seems
to be that of explicitly presenting one’s position as a deliberate act, an act based
on the decision to attach correctness (truth) to success “at the highest degree”,
as well as on a shared agreement as to what the most successful axiomatic system
for sets currently is. However, at the moment, there is no agreement among set-
theorists as to what the most successful theory of sets is.14 Skeptical positions
on the status of large cardinal axioms have been expressed (see e.g. [She03]).
Arguments like Steel’s to the effect that an interpretation of “ZFC + V = L”
in terms of “ZFC + large cardinal axioms” is possible but not vice-versa, have
been contested as well. Jensen, for instance, maintains that the relation between
“ZFC + large cardinal axioms” and “ZFC + V = L” is one of mutual inter-
pretability. For L itself can see the existence of “natural” models for large car-
dinal axioms if there are such cardinals in V . As a consequence of Shoenfield’s
Absoluteness Lemma, in fact, L and V have transitive countable models for the
same large cardinal hypotheses.15 “Hence we could just assume ourselves to be
in a countable segment of L when we assume H.”16
To sum up: the view that success furnishes evidence for correctness (truth),
though not per se contradictory, does not help in defending the view that the
program for making our picture of the universe more determinate must consist in
finding suitable extensions of “ZFC + large cardinal axioms”. At most it suggests
that one should be cautious in taking as correct (true) what one regards as the
most successful axiomatic system for sets, as there exist views about success that
run contrary to one’s own.
14Nor is there, one may guess, on the “conventional” view of correctness and truth introduced
here.
15In fact, if the hypothesis H holds in V , then by reflection H should have a model that
is a level Vκ of V (note this informal step in the argument) for some cardinal κ. By the
Lo¨wenheim-Skolem theorem, there is a countable elementary sub-model of Vκ, call it N , in
which H holds. By Mostowski’s Collapsing Theorem there is a transitive N that is a countable
model of H. Let be a ∈ R be a code for N . The formula asserting the existence of such an
a is Σ12. By Shoenfield’s Absoluteness Lemma, it is true in L. I.e. L sees the existence of a
transitive countable set model for H.
16Quoted with permission from the handout of a talk given by Jensen in Krakow in 1999.
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Let us add that, in fact, neither a simple identification of correctness (truth) with
success, nor the view that correctness (truth) is conventionally attached to success
“at the highest degree”, seems to underlie positions like Woodin’s. A Platonistic
attitude appears to be at work. This is explicitly admitted by Foreman in [FK10];
with regard to consistency results involving large cardinal axioms, he observes:
This type of unifying deep structure is taken as strong evidence
that the axioms proposed reflect some underlying reality and so is
often cited as a primary reason for accepting the existence of large
cardinals. ([FK10], x)
Under these circumstances, correctness (truth) rests no longer on success. Success
may well be regarded as a clue to it – if it is supposed that it is correctness (truth),
meant as a matter of “reflecting some underlying reality”, that ultimately implies
success (or, better, success “at the highest degree”). Moreover, by regarding cor-
rectness (truth) as sufficent, as opposed to necessary, to success, an explanation
would be given, too, for the existence of mutually exclusive successful systems of
set theory. For, under these circumstances, the existence of successful set theories
that cannot be said to be correct (true) is no longer contradictory. However, one
should still justify Platonism in order for this position to be sound. This is no
easy task. Neither pursuing this justification nor criticizing it belongs to the aims
of the present paper.
Having focused on the positions of Woodin, Steel and Foreman, let us now re-
turn to Shelah’s views. Here one abdicates the search for new axioms that may
yield solutions to questions independent of ZFC, solutions to which correctness or
truth can be attached as the end-stage of a process through which a shared con-
sensus is reached that certain mathematical developments, and the axioms that
make them possible, are the most successful ones. This abdication may have
positive consequences. It may work as a heuristic for exploiting the available
resources (ZFC), to the effect that light is shed on still undiscovered implications
of them, perhaps relevant with regard to independence phenomena. Shelah’s pcf
theory, developed entirely within ZFC, has a bearing on questions of cardinal
arithmetic like the Generalized Continuum Hypothesis.17 However, it might be
felt that whereas positions like Shelah’s are supported by the existence of incom-
patible successful set-theoretical developments, they also prescribe a halt to such
developments by regarding ZFC as all there is to be said about sets. Shelah’s
conclusions also sound arbitrary. Why should the view that a universe of ZFC
be not like “the Sun” but like “a human being of some fixed nationality” be a
definitive one? Why not regard it as a description of a state of affairs that need
not be permanent, merely reflecting the actual situation in set theory, where no
development stands out as the most successful (and hence, one may add, the
17See [She03], 220: “Cardinal arithmetic is loaded with consistency results because we ask
the wrong questions. [...]. We should replace cardinality by cofinality, as explained below (pcf
theory)”.
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correct or true) one? As it seems premature to say that convincing evidence is
available that the correct answer to the question “Is CH true/false?” is given by
a suitable extension of “ZFC + large cardinal axioms”, so seems it premature to
rule this out and be content with the view that the notion universe of all sets is
inherently undetermined.
As a case study supporting the above criticisms, we discuss the second author’s
Inner Model Hypothesis (IMH) in the following section. The IMH also provides a
striking example of a phenomenon alluded to above, the ambiguity of the concept
of “maximization”.
5. The Inner Model Hypothesis.
We begin with a restatement of our thesis. Objections can be raised against the
view that the notion universe of all sets can only be made determinate by finding
axiomatic extensions of “ZFC + large cardinal axioms” which successfully decide
questions independent of the latter. In advancing this view it is assumed that
mathematical success provides evidence for the correctness or truth of large cardi-
nal axioms, which renders these axioms definitive set-theoretic principles that one
can only “extend” but not contradict. In assuming that success implies correct-
ness (truth), however, one is either tacitly committed to Platonism or faces the
embarrassing situation that mutually exclusive and successful axiomatic systems
for sets coexist. On the other hand, no a priori ground seems to exist for ruling
out the possibility of making the notion universe of all sets more determinate
than it is now through the introduction of new axiomatic proposals.
By advancing the Inner Model Hypothesis, one de facto remains open to the
possibility of making the universe of sets more determinate. At the same time,
one does not impose the restriction of consistency with “ZFC + large cardinal
axioms”. The approach of the Inner Model Hypothesis is not to “determine”
the universe by directly postulating what sets exist in it (which is done when
e.g. large cardinals are assumed to exist in V ), but to state from a metatheoretical
perspective what properties the universe of sets is supposed to possess.
Let us discuss the hypothesis in more detail. How can metatheoretical properties
be identified which one may wish the universe V of sets to have? The suggestion
made in [Fri06] is that one start from ZFC (or from a theory for sets and classes
like Go¨del-Bernays) and provisionally regard V as a model for it endowed with
countably many sets (and classes). For a countable universe V many techniques
are available for creating not only inner universes of V but also outer universes
of V , i.e. universes V ∗ such that V ⊆ V ∗, to which V can be compared. These
techniques not only include (set and class) forcing, but also methods that arise
from further generalizations of the forcing method (such as hyperclass forcing) or
from infinitary model theory. Being able to compare V to a multitude of other
universes enables one to better formulate properties that one wishes the intended
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universe V to obey. The Inner Model Hypothesis takes advantage of this method
of comparison:
If a statement φ without parameters holds in an inner universe of some outer
universe of V (i.e. in some universe compatible with V ), then it already holds in
some inner universe of V .
Equivalently: statements that are internally consistent with respect to an outer
universe of V are already internally consistent in V , where a statement is inter-
nally consistent if it holds in some inner universe. It follows that by enlarging V
one gains nothing as far as internal consistency is concerned. So according to the
Inner Model Hypothesis, V is maximal with respect to internal consistency.18
Although the IMH is formulated by supposing V to be countable, the Inner Model
Hypothesis can also be formulated as a (weaker) hypothesis for an uncountable V .
This is done by restricting the notion of outer universe to the set- and class-generic
extensions of the given universe that preserve the Go¨del-Bernays axioms, thereby
reducing the hypothesis to a principle of ordinary class theory. Alternatively, one
may regard the IMH as saying that although V itself is not countable, it should
satisfy sentences that are true in countable universes which are maximal with
respect to internal consistency. It is also worth noting that having the universe
maximize internal consistency via the IMH generalizes a phenomenon known to
hold for formulas (without parameters) proved to be consistent by set-forcing.19
One knows a lot about the consistency strength of the Inner Model Hypothesis. It
is established by the following results.20 1) Assume that there is a Woodin cardi-
nal and a larger inaccessible cardinal. Then there are universes which maximize
internal consistency, so the Inner Model Hypothesis is consistent. 2) The Inner
Model Hypothesis implies that there are inner models with measurable cardinals
of arbitrarily large Mitchell order.
Note that by adopting the Inner Model Hypothesis, while not extending
“ZFC + large cardinal axioms”, one does appeal to large cardinals in two re-
spects. First, large cardinal axioms are invoked for establishing its consistency
strength. This acknowledges the major feature of the mathematical success of
large cardinal axioms, their ability to prove consistency. The relevance of these
axioms is seen here as metamathematical rather than as mathematical. Second,
one asks whether the Inner Model Hypothesis has relevant implications with re-
gard to large cardinals. This is in fact the case. Among the consequences of the
Inner Model Hypothesis is that no inaccessibles, hence no large cardinals, exist
in V and that the real numbers are not closed under the ] operation. That is
to say: not only is the Inner Model Hypothesis not an extension of the system
18To put it in other terms, if L = language of set/class theory and, for a universe W , Φ(W )
= all sentences of L which are true in some inner universe of W , then, under the Inner Model
Hypothesis, if V ⊆W then Φ(V ) = Φ(W ).
19See [Fri06] for the details of this claim.
20See [FWW08].
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“ZFC + large cardinals”; it is also incompatible with it! The consistency of large
cardinal axioms is however preserved under the IMH (V sees inner models for
them); it is only their existence that is contradicted.
This latter point also has important consequences for the methodological notion
of “maximization”. The IMH clearly asserts a maximal property of the universe
of sets, namely that internal consistency has been maximized. But it is at the
same time in conflict with the existence of large cardinals. This is despite the
fact that large cardinal axioms have also been traditionally assumed to assert a
form of maximality for the universe of sets. Let us return to Go¨del:
From an axiom in some sense opposite to [V = L], the negation
of Cantor’s conjecture could perhaps be derived. I am thinking of
an axiom which ... would state some maximum property of the
system of all sets, whereas [V = L] states a minimum property.
Note that only a maximum property would seem to harmonize
with the concept of set. ([Goe64], 262-3)
Note that there is no implication in this quote that “maximization” must be based
on large cardinal axioms. And indeed, the IMH provides an alternative way of
maximizing the universe of sets, thereby revealing the profound ambiguity of this
concept.
What about questions which are independent from ZFC? Some of them are de-
cided under the Inner Model Hypothesis, e.g. the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis
and the existence of a projective non-measurable set of reals, which turn out to be
true, and the existence of a Borel bijection between any two non-Borel analytic
sets, which, instead, turns out to be false.21 The Continuum Hypothesis remains
undecided, though. For, suppose that V satisfies the Inner Model Hypothesis.
One can create, by set forcing, a larger universe V [G], in which CH is true (using
a “Le´vy collapse”). Since V is contained in V [G], The Inner Model Hypothesis
is also true in V [G]. So the hypothesis is consistent with CH. It cannot imply its
negation. Similarly, one can create a larger universe V [H] in which CH is false
(by adding ℵ2 Cohen reals), the Inner Model Hypothesis being true in V [H]. So
the Inner Model Hypothesis cannot imply CH either. One needs a stronger ver-
sion of the Inner Model Hypothesis to settle CH, i.e. the hypothesis for formulas
21Theorem 15 in [Fri06] proves that that IMH implies the existence of a real R such that ZFC
fails in Lα[R] for all ordinals α. This property implies that (a) for some real R, ℵ1 = ℵL[R]1 , which
in turn implies that (b) for some real R, R] does not exist, which is equivalent to (c): for some
real R, Jensen’s covering property holds relative to L[R] (i.e., every uncountable set of ordinals
is a subset of a set in L[R] of the same size). The truth of the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis
and the Singular Square principle and the falsity of the existence of a Borel-isomorphism of
non-Borel analytic sets (via the results presented in [Har78]) follow from (c), while the existence
of a projective non-measurable set of reals (via the results in [She84]) follows from (a).
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with globally absolute parameters.22 A consistency proof for the resulting Strong
Inner Model Hypothesis (SIMH) is however still lacking.
Let us conclude with a bold question. Will the Inner Model Hypothesis, and its
implications, be accepted as a definitive feature of the universe, making it more
determinate than it is now? According to the views presented throughout this
paper, the considerable mathematical success of the IMH is to play a decisive
role in this respect, whether or not one deliberately decides to attach correctness
(truth) to the most successful set-theoretic hypotheses. But the philosophical
implications of the IMH are clear, as it presents an important challenge to two
widely-shared views in contemporary set theory.
22See [Fri06].
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